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Abstract: Several systems have been proposed to monitor wireless sensor networks (WSN). 
These systems may be active (causing a high degree of intrusion) or passive (low 
observability inside the nodes). This paper presents the implementation of an active hybrid 
(hardware and software) monitor with low intrusion. It is based on the addition to the 
sensor node of a monitor node (hardware part) which, through a standard interface, is able 
to receive the monitoring information sent by a piece of software executed in the sensor 
node. The intrusion on time, code, and energy caused in the sensor nodes by the monitor is 
evaluated as a function of data size and the interface used. Then different interfaces, 
commonly available in sensor nodes, are evaluated: serial transmission (USART), serial 
peripheral interface (SPI), and parallel. The proposed hybrid monitor provides highly 
detailed information, barely disturbed by the measurement tool (interference), about the 
behavior of the WSN that may be used to evaluate many properties such as performance, 
dependability, security, etc. Monitor nodes are self-powered and may be removed after  
the monitoring campaign to be reused in other campaigns and/or WSNs. No other  
hardware-independent monitoring platforms with such low interference have been found in 
the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have been the subject of significant research and development in 
recent years. However they are yet to be deployed on a mass scale because sensor networks may 
experience problems or errors in their operation. Many causes for such issues have been identified, 
such as interference in the transmission medium, security attacks (especially in WSN [1]), adverse 
environmental conditions, and malfunctioning nodes. The node faults, their sources, and detection 
approaches are diverse, as detailed in [2]. Although debugging and operations testing is usually carried 
out during the development and implementation of this type of network, when sensors are deployed the 
conditions may be very different and unanticipated events often occur. 
The availability of suitable sensor network diagnostic tools is a key issue in progressing to  
real-world deployment of WSN. Nowadays, there are no standard tools or standard architectures in this 
field. Most of the proposals for monitoring and debugging do not consider enough aspects of sensor 
networks to be fully useful or are built for very specific network architectures. According to [3], there are 
many challenges in several aspects of sensor networks—architectural, functional, and dynamic—which 
have yet to be researched. Applications that require safe wireless sensor networks such as the Internet 
of Things, critical e-health systems, and ambient intelligence cannot be successfully addressed without 
these kind of tools. 
So-called monitoring systems—or simply “monitors”—are used to evaluate the performance and 
operation of a sensor network in controlled conditions or even in a real environment. Monitors can 
focus on many performance parameters, such as throughput, jitter, response time or reliability, and 
even on security and intrusion detection in the network, as described in [4]. 
The use of these monitoring systems could be helpful in all stages in the life-cycle of a WSN. WSN 
researchers could use a monitor to perform comparative analysis of new proposals. Designers could 
use a monitor to select the best suitable techniques for a given application’s requirements. In 
implementation, the enhanced debugging capabilities brought by these monitor tools are unbeatable. 
Deployment is much easier when the correct functioning of the nodes can be verified in situ. During 
operation, malfunctions could be diagnosed without stopping the system and any system redesign 
could benefit from more detailed information about current functioning. In addition, these tools could 
become fundamental in the standardization and certification of applications based on WSN. Although 
monitoring systems generate a non-negligible cost, they are necessary to detect problems in the 
deployment of the wireless solution. These costs, as with many measurement tools, may be considered 
to be justified as far as the monitoring system is only attached when necessary, is used for a finite 
amount of time and then may be removed to be reused, if possible, in another monitoring activity. 
Monitors are usually built following one of two possible approaches. Active monitors involve 
additional hardware and/or software in the sensor nodes, interacting with them. Consequently, active 
monitors usually require the modification of the sensor nodes to be monitored. This interferes with the 
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node’s normal operation and measured parameters may vary from those of an unmonitored node. 
However, more variables may be observed, and thus the data obtained are more accurate. 
On the other hand, passive monitors rely on the observation of the external behavior of the monitored 
system without any interference with its normal operation. Machine-learning algorithms [3]—which 
analyze the behavior of the system—may be used to evaluate and predict the presence of errors, 
undesirable operation or unexpected events. The monitor does not interfere with the monitored nodes, 
but only externally observable variables can be measured. 
There is also another approach for monitor construction, which depends on whether the monitor is 
based on hardware or software. A software monitor is implemented by means of a specific code, 
application, or plug-in to the operating system of the node, which accesses the system status and 
reports relevant information. Usually, a software monitor yields in-depth information about the 
system’s performance, but it may interfere with the operation of the monitored system. 
A hardware monitor consists of electronic devices connected to the monitored system, which collect 
data from interesting system points. Hardware monitors are usually less intrusive than software 
monitors, but they involve the use of additional components. 
Each monitor approach by itself cannot cover all aspects of monitoring tasks, as we will discuss in 
the next section. Monitors can also combine both approaches (hardware and software) in order to 
achieve the advantages of both types and obtain a complete vision of the system, while trying to keep 
interference to a minimum. These are the so-called hybrid monitors [5]. 
This paper presents an active low intrusion hybrid monitor [6], based on both hardware and 
software. This monitor can record the events which occur in a node of a sensor network and store them 
in a non-volatile memory for later analysis. Moreover, it can be incorporated into a complete 
monitoring platform which includes other acquisition possibilities, such as passive monitors, as 
described in [7]. 
This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, monitoring tools are described in Section 2. 
Section 3 explains the architecture of the non-intrusive hybrid monitor. The implementation of the 
monitor is described in Section 4. Section 5 details the evaluation of the intrusion produced by the 
monitoring tool. Finally, a discussion and conclusions are presented in Sections 6 and 7. 
2. Monitoring Tools 
There are several monitoring sensor networks tools and techniques; most of them follow one 
approach and focus on WSN. In [3], both monitoring and debugging tools are considered and 
compared. This section contains a brief summary of some of most important and relevant tools. 
SNMS (Sensor Network Management System) [8] and Sympathy [9] are two of the earliest and  
best-known monitoring systems. SNMS is a complete management system, focused on working with 
any type of sensor network. It is built on TinyOS [10]—an open source operating system designed for  
low-power devices—and enables a review of the state of a node and information to be saved locally. 
Nevertheless, it generates substantial intrusion and is oriented to management rather than monitoring. 
On the other hand, Sympathy works as a passive monitor, and can detect and debug pre-and-post 
deployment errors. It operates by analyzing the data arriving at the sink of a sensor network, applying 
metrics, and inferring where in the network a fault or failure may occur. It also considers the 
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aggregation of a small overhead in the network to increase its accuracy. However, it only considers the 
transmitted data and thus cannot observe the internal node information, something which could increase  
monitoring accuracy. 
SNIF (Sensor Network Inspection Framework) [11], Pimoto [12], LiveNet [13], SNDS (Sensor 
Network Distributed Sniffer) [14], NSSN (Network monitoring and packet Sniffing tool for wireless 
Sensor Networks) [15], and EPMOSt (Energy-efficient Passive Monitoring SysTem for WSN) [16] are 
examples of passive monitors. Their approach consists in deploying a network of sniffers with an 
interface to capture all transmissions from nodes. The main difference between them is how the 
captured data is processed. Some of them transmit the data—via TCP/IP (Transport Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) or another radio interface—to another device for processing, and others can 
function as a sink, collecting and analyzing the information. They can also provide real-time analysis 
of data sensor network operation. Nevertheless, all these tools only capture the transmitted frames “on 
the air”; they cannot obtain information directly from nodes. 
Despite its name, Passive Diagnosis (PAD) for WSN [17] is an active monitor system with low 
intrusion. It is based on a probabilistic diagnosis approach—based on a Belief (or Bayesian) Network—to 
infer the root causes of abnormal WSN operation. This adds a probe in each node which marks the 
packets with relevant data with very little overhead. However, PAD has to wait for a message 
transmission to send information and it might not determine when an error has occurred. Moreover, as 
non-sense nodes (such as router nodes) do not send sensed data, they are unable to send any monitor 
information to indicate possible abnormal operation. 
Memento [18] and Lightweight Tracing [19] are examples of active monitors. Both use short 
encoding with sensor node events and information. The first adds its code protocol to a message and 
transmits it. Memento can detect problems in a node by using information provided by their neighbors 
in the network. In Lightweight Tracing the events are stored in non-volatile memory by using a very 
light coding. Further reconstruction and debugging of node and network behavior is then possible. 
Because both are active monitors, they generate substantial intrusion. 
Minerva [20] is not a monitor, but a test-bed for WSN. It uses a debugging port and tracing port 
connected to the sensor node to observe the behavior of the node. Minerva has very interesting features 
but is inadequate for monitoring in real environments. 
Finally, Spi-Snooper [21] integrates hardware and software in a hybrid approach. The hardware 
architecture brings the sensor node and the monitor together in a single unit in a transparent manner. 
The monitor spies on the SPI interface used to connect the sensor node to its radio module. The 
software architecture has two operation modes: active and passive. In passive mode the monitor—called 
the co-processor—mainly logs the communication through the SPI bus and checks some node data. In 
active mode it assumes the control of the SPI and the radio interface. However, it can only be used in 
sensor nodes that transmit through a SPI port. Only the data transmitted through this SPI interface can 
be monitored. Obviously, this technique cannot be used in sensor nodes with built-in radio modules. 
Each one of these proposals has advantages and disadvantages. The proposed active monitors 
usually involve a great deal of intrusion. Meanwhile, the proposed passive monitors can only observe 
transmitted data, they are unable to observe events inside the node. Both the addition of monitoring 
information to a transmitted message and new messages to the network cause a decrease in network 
performance. Monitors based exclusively on software cannot work if the node fails. Hardware-based 
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proposed monitors are too architecture-specific. Consequently, a monitor system with sufficiently 
broad network information coverage which also keeps intrusion low is required. Furthermore, this 
system has to be sufficiently generic to be applied to all hardware architecture. Many characteristics of 
the proposals studied were taken into consideration to form a base for the design of our monitoring 
system, which also attempts to minimize the drawbacks of these previous tools. 
3. Architecture of a WSN Monitor 
3.1. Specifications and Characteristics of the Monitor 
Taking into consideration the findings from many previous deployments of WSN, the characteristics 
of wireless sensor network monitors (addressed in Section 1) and the existing proposals discussed in 
Section 2, the following specifications are deemed necessary for a new WSN monitor: 
1. It must be able to observe all the relevant data. This would endow it with significant  
debugging potential. 
2. It must be as hardware/software independent as possible. 
3. It must be reusable and configurable. 
4. The monitor must be easily attachable and removable, without stopping the operation of the 
monitored system. 
5. The monitor must cause minimum disturbance to the operation of the observed system  
(low intrusion). 
When addressing these specifications, software traps are considered to be the best way to achieve a 
high observability while maintaining high flexibility, as the designer defines the relevant events and 
introduces the trap code in the required places in the code. In order to achieve a very low intrusion 
level, a hardware attachable node frees the monitored system from the task of monitoring data 
management. The communication between both nodes must be performed through standard interfaces 
already available in most of the monitored nodes, providing reusability and hardware independence. 
Consequently, an active hybrid hardware/software solution is considered to be the best proposal. 
Moreover, although monitoring systems are usually expensive, this approach minimizes costs 
because the proposed system is reusable and scalable, adjusting to monitoring requirements. 
Finally, it is particularly interesting that the design of the monitor is based on a modular approach to 
make the system easily adaptable to new monitoring environments and improve reutilization. In this way, 
the design must be partitioned following a hierarchical layered architecture in order to attain modularity, 
making it possible to change monitor modules without changing the whole implementation. 
3.2. Proposed Architecture 
In this section the architecture and operation of the proposed monitor is presented. It is based in a 
standard-oriented architecture in order to provide benefits such as universality, reusability and flexibility. 
As observed in the bibliography and discussed above, every monitoring system has to address some 
issues in order to be functional. Our proposal identifies these problems and classifies them into  
three categories: 
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Monitoring data. These data must be captured, analyzed, and shown to the user in a meaningful 
way. The semantic meaning of the data depends on the application and the monitoring requirements. 
Once obtained, data must be presented in a standard format to ensure the integration of data 
provided by heterogeneous sources. Some issues related to this category include a common time base 
and capturing conditions. 
As the monitored system is distributed in space, all the obtained data must be centralized and stored 
to provide a global comprehension of the whole system functioning. 
Keeping these different—and usually independent—problems in mind, the proposed architecture is 
composed of three layers, as shown in Figure 1. 
The Monitoring Layer will be located in the upper level of the architecture. This layer is in charge 
of all the issues related, and specific to the WSN under observation. It must deal with the definition of 
what should be monitored, how this information should be acquired and the way it has to be processed 
and shown to the user. 
The Information Layer is located under the Monitoring Layer. It must represent the obtained 
information in a standard way. This level also deals with timing issues, such as when the information 
must be captured (triggering) and storing this time value with the obtained data (time stamp). 
Finally, the Interchange Layer allows the information captured at different points alongside the 
monitored WSN to be transferred and stored. The upper layers will retrieve this information to be 
analyzed and/or visualized by the Monitoring Layer. 
In this three-layer architecture the communication between layers and entities in the same layer is 
similar to that standardized in the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) reference model for networks [22]. 
Each layer defines interfaces to communicate with the upper and lower ones. One of the advantages of 
working with a defined architecture is that changes and developments in an entity/layer should not 
affect the other layers. Hence, any improvements to the monitor system will be easier to develop and 
implement. Moreover, it is straightforward to reuse this hybrid monitor in another sensor network by 
making the required changes in the respective layer. 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of the proposed hybrid monitor. 
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4. The Active Low Intrusion Hybrid Monitor 
In this section an implementation based on this layered architecture is presented. As the main 
objective of this implementation is to study intrusion, the implemented system is focused on all 
modules that affect said intrusion (capture subsystem, information layer, and interchange layer; first 
column in Figure 1), simplifying the other modules that do not. 
4.1. Active Low Intrusion Hybrid Monitor Structure 
Figure 2 shows the structure of the implemented hybrid monitor. Three hardware devices can be 
identified: the sensor node to be monitored (mote), the attachable and reusable monitor node, and a 
storage device. 
The capture subsystem in the Monitoring Layer is implemented by means of a software traps 
mechanism which runs in the sensor node hardware. 
The Information Layer entity of the hybrid monitor is implemented in the monitor node. The 
interface between the sensor node and the monitor node, supporting communication between the 
Monitoring and Information Layers, is performed through a standard communications interface (serial, 
SPI, parallel, etc.). The use of these standard interfaces provides hardware independence and facilitates 
reutilization, making the attach/detach operation straightforward. 
 
Figure 2. Implementation of the proposed hybrid monitor. 
Finally, the Interchange Layer entity is implemented by means of a storage device handled by the 
monitor node, where the collected data will be stored. The communication between the storage and 
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monitor node is done through a serial interface, as shown in Figure 2. Future implementations could 
consider the use of more sophisticated storage and distribution systems, such as distributed databases 
and secondary communication networks. 
More powerful analysis and visualization subsystems, with lower layer support entities, are not 
considered at this point because they would not modify the intrusion evaluation carried in this research. 
4.2. Monitor Operation 
In order to observe and evaluate the behavior of the system under observation, the monitor must 
register the sequence of events that may characterize said behavior. Consequently, the first step must 
be to define the monitoring points—called probes—which are of interest to the designer. 
With this information, the application code must be modified in order to generate the appropriate 
monitoring events. This modification is implemented using software trap mechanisms. 
When a trap is fired, some associated information bytes are generated that may include additional 
information along with the event code. This monitor allows the designer to decide which additional 
data can be included, so providing a highly flexible monitoring tool, and increasing the accuracy of 
obtained information. For example, an error event may include an additional error code that better 
describes its causes. A transmission event may include part or the whole message, making a packet 
traceable through the sensor network. This can be considered a significant improvement when 
compared with other proposed systems that record events but cannot associate additional information 
to them. 
These bytes must be processed, formatted, and recorded in a log file. Most active monitors require 
the observed node to run these processes. Our approach frees the observed sensor node from having to 
run said processes—and thus reduces the intrusion—by means of the attached monitor node. The 
monitor node is in charge of these processes, which include time stamp, data format, data storage or  
(in future developments) data transmission. 
Our solution (Figure 3) only requires the trap capture routine to transmit the event and its associated 
information to the monitor node through the Monitoring-Information interface (Mon-Inf interface). 
The monitor node is in charge of processing the data, including time-stamping. It also applies a 
standard data format, as described below. Finally, the monitor node must also record this data. In  
this approach, the data is stored in a SD (Secure Digital flash memory) module through the  
Information-Interchange interface, implemented by a serial link. 
 
Figure 3. Hybrid monitor operation outline. 
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In order to minimize the intrusion, the time and resources required for the sensor node to send the 
monitoring messages must be as low as possible. One of the main advantages of using standard 
interfaces is that most sensor nodes include specific hardware to perform the transmission in parallel 
with normal microcontroller operation, without disturbing it. The degree of parallelism obtained 
between both operations is critical in determining the level of intrusion. That is the reason why this 
article evaluates the intrusion obtained when the most commonly-available interfaces are used for this  
Mon-Inf communication. 
Figure 4 shows the data flow and operation of the implemented hybrid monitor. The tasks which are 
usually performed by active monitors in the observed node have been divided between the sensor node 
and monitor node. The operations to be performed by the sensor node have been minimized and the 
rest, such as time stamp, data format, data storage, etc. have been moved to the monitor node. 
Communication routines have been included in the sensor node to transmit the data. 
Consequently, as shown in Figure 4, two routines are included in the Monitoring Layer inside the 
sensor node. The first of them—which can be called as a routine by the code running in the sensor 
node—prepares the data about events to be sent to the monitor and sends the first bytes. As the monitor 
can manage traps that require many bytes, the message may be too long to be transmitted in just one 
iteration. In this case, a second routine is activated by an interruption when an ACK (acknowledgment 
message) is received from the monitor node. This routine sends the additional data until the end of  
the message. 
The use of an ACK mechanism has experimentally proved to be necessary to guarantee a more 
reliable monitoring operation. The intrusion introduced by this ACK mechanism can be considered 
very low, due to the low priority interrupts used in implementation, as discussed below. 
 
Figure 4. Flowchart of hybrid monitor operation. 
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The monitor node is always waiting for information from the sensor node. This data must be 
processed when it is received, which involves several operations. Data must be stamped with the 
appropriate time stamp. When the first byte arrives, the time stamp is registered. Then, the monitor 
node receives the rest of the message. An ACK message is sent to the sensor node for every piece of 
data received. The message has to be processed when all of it has been received. In this 
implementation, the message treatment consists in the creation of a record which includes the date, 
time stamp, event code, and additional data (which is used in our example to indicate the iteration number). 
This implementation uses a 4-bit coding for events, as shown in Table 1. Designers are free to 
define their own codes (and additional data) in order to adjust the system to the monitoring and 
application operation they require. 
Finally, after the monitoring campaign, monitor nodes should be removed to be reused in other 
monitoring campaigns, even on WSNs whose sensor nodes are based on different hardware architectures. 
Table 1. Example of 4-bit event codes. 
Code Meaning 
#define Log_Reset 0x00 //Node Reset/Initialization 
#define Log_Sense0 0x01 //Read sensor 0 (first/unique) 
#define Log_Sense1 0x02 //Read sensor 1 (second, if it exists) 
#define Log_Sense2 0x03 //Read sensor 2 (third, if it exists) 
#define Log_Wakeup 0x04 //Wake up from sleep/stop 
#define Log_RxData 0x05 //Node receives data 
#define Log_TxData 0x06 //Node sends data 
#define Log_RxACK 0x07 //Node receives ACK 
#define Log_RRoute 0x08 //Node reroutes data (if applicable) 
#define Log_Sleep 0x09 //Node goes to sleep mode 
#define Log_Stop 0x0A //Node goes to stop mode 
#define Log_LowBat 0x0B //Low battery indication 
#define Log_SinkRx 0x0C //Sink receives data 
#define Log_SinkTx 0x0D //Sink sends data 
#define Log_SinkEr 0x0E //Error in sink 
#define Log_Error 0x0F //Error in node 
4.3. Hardware Implementation 
Figure 5 shows the hardware implementation of the monitor shown in Figure 2. The monitor node 
(on the left) is connected to the sensor node (on the right). The monitor node has been implemented 
using a commercially available microcontroller system, based on the STM32F051R8 ARM Cortex-M0 
microcontroller (STMicroelectronics, Geneva, Italy). The authors consider this architecture  
to be representative in current applications. This microcontroller also offers several common  
interfaces—GPIO (General Purpose Input/Output), SPI, USART, and others—which can be used for 
our purpose [23]. The monitor board has been connected to a SD card through its SPI interface. 
The implementation costs in the sensor nodes is, usually, very low. Commonly, microcontrollers in 
sensor nodes have free communication interfaces that can be used to send the traps to the Monitor 
Sensors 2015, 15 23937 
 
 
node. The only additional hardware engineering required is that the selected interface is externally 
available through a connector. 
Figure 5 also shows a sensor node, which is used for monitor evaluation. It is a previously used 
sensor node which has already been deployed in a real temperature control application. It is based on 
an ARM Cortex-M0 (STMicroelectronics, Geneva, Italy) and includes a XBEE (Digi international Inc., 
Minnetonka, MN, USA) wireless communication module, a MAXIM LM75 temperature transducer 
(Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., Sunnyvale, CA, USA) and an external antenna. It runs an 
application that periodically wakes up from sleep mode, takes a measurement from the temperature 
sensor, transmits the results through the wireless communications module, and enters into sleep mode 
for 60 s. In this sensor node no hardware modifications were required, as the three studied interfaces  
(SPI, GPIO, and USART) were available through the connectors. 
 
Figure 5. Monitor node connected to sensor node. 
The intrusion caused by the active hybrid monitor is related to the communications interface 
between the sensor node and monitor node. To evaluate this intrusion, three different interfaces were 
considered. The interfaces studied, which are usually found in most microcontrollers, were SPI (shown 
in Figure 5), USART (Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter), and parallel 
transmission using 16 GPIO ports. Parallel and SPI data width is 16 bits, and USART data width is 8 
bits. Moreover, three transmission speeds were evaluated for the SPI interface. To compare the 
performance of each interface, four sizes of transmitted data (common sizes of 16, 32, 64, and 128 bits 
per trap) were used. The larger the data being transmitted, the more detailed the information provided 
in each trap, but also the higher the interference. 
The monitor node constitutes the Information Layer entity of the monitor. It has a built-in RTC 
(Real Time Clock), which is used to generate timestamps for the event register. 
4.4. Software Implementation 
The software part of the presented active hybrid monitor consists in a library added to the sensor 
node and the code in the monitor node. 
The library on the sensor node offers an Application Programming Interface (API) which allows the 
designer a user-friendly way to introduce monitoring capabilities into its application code. This has 
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been implemented using software traps and constitutes the capture subsystem of the Monitoring Layer. 
These software traps consist in a set of instructions located in the code of the monitored node. They 
send information when they are executed, usually related to significant operations—from a monitoring 
point of view—in the node, and can also send optional additional information, such as the value of a 
variable or the contents of a message. 
Table 1 shows an example of a software trap used in the presented hybrid monitor. The code shown 
uses parallel communication as the interface between both nodes. The WriteLog function in the main 
procedure is a software trap which has been included in the application code. The parameters trap code 
(Log_sense0) and measured value (temper) are intended to be recorded by the monitoring system, 
indicating a temperature has been reached and its current value. 
The implementation of the WriteLog function is in charge of transmitting the value through the 
desired interface. In this example, only 16-bit-length traps are considered and the acknowledge 
mechanism is omitted for simplicity. 
As can be seen in Table 2, software traps are implemented as a routine call with very few 
instructions and thus cause very little intrusion. The monitoring layer also considers the trap collection 
procedure in the sensor node, as shown in Figure 2, which must transmit the trap data through the 
standard communication interface. The left block in Figure 4 shows this transmission flowchart in the 
sensor node. The right block in this figure shows how the monitor node implements the software 
required to receive this data. 
Table 2. Sample of software trap program code for parallel interface. 
int main (void){ // application code 
… 
  TempValue = LM75_ReadTemp(0x94); 
  TempCels = TempValue >> 4; 
  temper = TempCels * 0.0625; 
 WriteLog(Log_Sense0,(uint8_t) temper); // Software Trap 
 SendValue(temper); 
… 
} // end application code 
void WriteLog (uint8_t cod, uint8_t val){ 
 uint16_t buff = cod | (val<<8); //Prepare buffer = code + value  
 GPIO_Write(GPIOB, buff); // put buffer through parallel port 
 GPIO_WriteBit(GPIOA, GPIO_Pin_0, Bit_SET); // Write pulse (up) 
 GPIO_WriteBit(GPIOA, GPIO_Pin_0, Bit_RESET); // Write pulse (down) 
} 
Both the sensor node and monitor node may benefit from the availability of standard 
communication libraries, providing independence between hardware and software. For instance, 
Cortex Microcontroller Software Interface Standard (CMSIS) has been used in both sides to implement 
these routines. This provides a standardized level, which may be easily reused in other CMSIS based 
microcontrollers and even ported to other architectures applying this methodology to their own 
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libraries [24]. As the messages sent through the interface between the sensor node and monitor node do 
not change, the monitor node requires no modification. 
The monitor node also implements the Information Layer, as shown in Figure 2. Consequently, it is 
in charge of applying a time stamp and data formatting to the received traps. 
The monitor node is also responsible for Interchange Layer functions. Figure 2 shows that this 
implementation of the Interchange Layer consists of a non-volatile memory (Secure Digital—SD—card) 
where the captured information will be stored. This approach is similar to that used in Lightweight 
Tracing [19], but in our proposal this memory is attached to the monitor node instead of the sensor 
node. Future versions of the Interchange Layer could include a radio interface to transmit the collected 
information, either in real time or in a scheduled manner. 
4.5. Monitoring Data Obtained 
Although the main objective of this paper is not the application of the monitor to a real sensor 
network, but to study of the intrusion caused by it, the validation of the correct behavior of the monitor 
was considered to be a necessary, previous condition. 
Figure 6 shows a trace of the information registered by the monitor in a single node. Three kinds of 
events—wake up, transmission, and sleep—were deemed sufficient to measure the intrusion and, thus, 
only three traps were inserted in the code of the sensor node to be monitored. These codes are sent to 
the monitor node through the Mon-Inf interface. The monitor node processes the data in the 
Information Layer, adding the time stamp information and formatting said data in CSV (Comma 
Separated Values format (ASCII—American Standard Code for Information Interchange—text 
separated by commas). Finally, the Interchange Layer is also implemented in the monitor node to store 
said data in a SD card. 
 
Figure 6. Information recovered from the SD card attached to the monitor node. 
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CSV format was selected for the Information Layer because of its portability, it being compatible 
with most analysis and visualization tools. These tools are sufficient for the evaluation of the intrusion 
(the main objective of this research). Future implementations will improve the functions offered in 
analysis and visualization subsystems in accordance with the architecture shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 6 shows part of the information generated by the hybrid monitor after recovering the 
produced file from the SD card. This information includes date, time, ms, event code, and additional 
data. Event codes 04, 06, and 09 (Table 2) have been used for wake up, transmission, and sleep events, 
respectively. Additional values for wake up and transmission events—also sent as additional 
information—indicate the iteration number. All this data can be delivered to the visualization and 
control subsystem (Figure 1) by using the Information Layer services. 
5. Intrusion Evaluation 
Three principal intrusion aspects must be considered. Time intrusion deals with the increase in 
execution time of the sensor node caused by the monitor. Taking into account that sensor nodes usually 
have a limited flash memory, code intrusion evaluates how many additional bytes are required to 
implement the monitoring of the sensor node’s program. Finally, energy intrusion evaluates the 
additional energy the monitoring operation requires. Many experiments were performed, following a 
detailed experimental plan, which took into consideration the previously cited interfaces and data sizes 
in order to measure the intrusion of the active hybrid monitor. The results obtained are presented in  
this section. 
In order to obtain reliable results, n replications were performed for each measurement, n being 
calculated as follows: 
The results for each measurement were considered as random variables (X1, X2, …, Xn) with a μ 
mean value. Measurements were repeated n times until an estimation of μ was obtained with a 90% 
confidence interval according to Equation 1, where tn−1,0.95 represents the upper limit of the Student’s  
t-distribution on n − 1 degrees of freedom, and X(n) and S2(n) are the mean and the variance of the 
results obtained in the different experiments: 
തܺ(݊) ± ݐ௡ିଵ,଴.ଽହටܵ
ଶ(݊) ݊ൗ  (1)
5.1. Time Intrusion Analysis 
Time intrusion was determined by the replication of an experiment which consisted in measuring 
the amount of time needed to fulfill one thousand application iterations in the sensor node during both 
monitored and not-monitored operation. During monitored operation, a single software trap was added 
to be fired when the wake-up event occurred. The time required to fulfill the iterations in monitored 
mode is called monitor mode execution time. The execution time of the same program in the sensor 
node without traps was also measured (hereafter referred to as reference time). The program consists 
of a wake-up, measurement of the value from a transducer, and pass-to-sleep mode operations, 
repeated one thousand times. Reference time was found to be 5805 ms. 
As previously mentioned, three interface implementations and four data sizes were combined to 
yield the results in Table 3. This table shows the difference between the monitor mode execution time 
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and the reference time, divided by the number of iterations. As there is one trap per iteration, this value 
is the time intrusion per trap. 
Table 3. Time intrusion in sensor node for each log event (ms). 
Data Size Parallel (16 Bits) 
SPI  
18 mbps 
SPI  
4.5 mbps 
SPI  
2.25 mbps 
USART 
115.2 kbps 
16 bits 3.80 3.10 3.10 3.20 6.20 
32 bits 7.30 6.10 6.20 6.20 13.60 
64 bits 16.50 13.00 13.10 13.10 28.80 
128 bits 31.90 28.10 28.10 28.20 60.60 
SPI and USART interfaces with dedicated hardware allow the communication processes to be 
executed concurrently with application code execution. In these interfaces (see code in Table 1), trap 
routines are not concerned with communication and they merely write the outgoing data into the 
interface buffers. Then the sensor node program may continue. On the other hand, the parallel interface 
has no dedicated hardware controller and an additional line is required to generate a reception 
interruption in the monitor node. That is the reason why the time intrusion is slightly greater than when 
using the SPI interface. As expected, time intrusion increases for larger data sizes. In the case of 
USART the intrusion time is about double that of the other interfaces, because it only sends 8 bits  
per transmission (the other interfaces considered send 16 bits) and it has to manage twice the number  
of interruptions. 
 
Figure 7. Time outline for event log generation. 
Figure 7 shows that the time required to process a trap event in both the sensor node and monitor 
node. Despite the fact that the sensor node can execute part of its application code while the trap is 
being processed, it is not possible to launch a new trap before its treatment is complete. This minimum 
time between traps is shown in Figure 7 as the “Period for event log generation”. 
This period starts when the sensor node code reaches a software trap. The trap code and its 
associated data must be prepared to be sent in several messages through the Mon-Inf interface. When it 
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is ready, the dedicated hardware in the sensor node is in charge of transmitting the first message 
containing this data to the monitor node. After that, the monitor node generates the time stamp and 
acknowledges the transmission to the sensor node. As the ACK is received, the sensor node transmits 
the next message containing the trap information. This process repeats until all the messages related to 
the trap event have been transmitted. 
The time intrusion (Table 3) every trap introduces is the sum of several time intervals (red boxes  
in Figure 7). 
It can be seen that this time intrusion in the sensor node is not affected by the communication time. 
The hardware implementation in modern microcontrollers allows the CPU to execute code (application 
code) while transmission is being performed. However, this communication time is not negligible 
when dealing with the maximum event generation rate, and it has to be taken into consideration to 
evaluate the maximum frequency event generation rate. 
This frequency is related to the processing time in the monitor node. This time has also been 
measured and Table 4 shows the values obtained. As shown in Figure 7, the processing time is 
measured from the arrival of the first data to the receipt of the last piece of information. Timestamp 
generation takes 15.8 ms and is performed when the first data message of the trap arrives. 
Table 4. Processing time in monitor node for each event log (ms). 
Data Size 
Parallel  
(16 Bits) 
SPI  
18 mbps 
SPI  
4.5 mbps 
SPI  
2.25 mbps 
USART 
115.2 kbps 
16 bits 17.80 17.40 17.40 17.40 88.40 
32 bits 22.90 23.40 25.40 27.80 262.00 
64 bits 32.90 34.40 40.10 48.20 612.00 
128 bits 52.80 56.20 69.80 88.00 1300.00 
As shown in Table 4, when dealing with 16-bit events the times obtained are similar for every 
interface—except the USART—as the process time depends mainly on timestamp generation. For 
larger data sizes the processing time is slightly less when using the parallel interface instead of SPI, 
especially when the SPI speed is low. In the case of the USART interface, the processing time is much 
greater because of its low transmission speed and the fact that it can only send 8 bits at a time, whereas 
the other options considered can send 16 bits at a time. As expected, the processing time increases for 
larger data sizes. 
The values in Tables 3 and 4 are dependent on the architecture used (48 MHz ARM Cortex-M0, 
STMicroelectronics, Geneva, Italy) in both the sensor node and monitor node. A monitor node based 
on a faster microcontroller will reduce the timestamp generation time, and hence will also reduce the 
processing time and increase performance. Moreover, the time intrusion and processing time could 
change depending on the sensor node characteristics, such as core frequency, buffer availability, 
architecture, interface to monitor, among others. Nevertheless, the time intrusion in the sensor node is 
very low when compared with the processing time in the monitor node. The relationship between both 
times is not architecture-dependent. This means a low degree of time intrusion can be expected when 
monitoring other sensor node architectures. 
Sensors 2015, 15 23943 
 
 
When comparing this proposal with others in the bibliography, it is important to note that active  
non-hybrid monitors make the sensor node perform all the monitoring tasks (data capture, formatting, 
and storage); meanwhile, with our proposal, the time needed to perform all the aforementioned tasks is 
replaced by a small communication time, thereby substantially reducing the intrusion. 
A USART interface was not deemed a good option to be used in our monitor because of its 
comparatively low speed and high processing time which result in low performance. Therefore this 
interface is considered in further results for comparison purposes only. 
5.2. Code Intrusion Analysis 
As memory resources are limited for sensor nodes, the evaluation of the intrusion on program code 
is relevant. Code used in the sensor node was generated by Keil Microcontroller Development Kit 
(MDK) version 5, a comprehensive software development environment for Cortex-M processor-based 
microcontrollers which includes an Integrated Development Environment (IDE), Compiler,  
and Debugger [25]. 
Size difference in bytes between the pure application code and the trap-modified code has been 
considered in a binary compiled program. The main differences between both codes consist in the 
addition of the port initialization subroutine and several data transmission instructions. Table 5 shows 
the intrusion in bytes on program code in the sensor node. Intrusion is not related to the 
communication speed, thus this parameter has not been considered. 
Since transmission code is reused for all the traps, a new event may be monitored by merely adding 
a trap call of 8 bytes to the sensor node code. 
Table 5. Intrusion on code: Initialization and one event log (bytes). 
Interface 16 Bits 32 Bits 64 Bits 128 Bits 
Parallel 228 252 268 276 
SPI 428 452 468 476 
USART 292 316 332 340 
Code intrusion in size (SIntrusion) may be predicted by means of Equation (2), where Sinit is the value 
appearing in Table 5 (which corresponds to the initialization and interrupt routine), and n is the number 
of trap calls included in the application code. As expected, for a small number of monitored traps, the 
code intrusion is mostly determined by the initialization code. 
ூܵ௡௧௥௨௦௜௢௡ = ௜ܵ௡௜௧ + 8 × (݊ − 1) (2)
5.3. Energy Intrusion Analysis 
Power consumption is a key aspect of sensor network nodes. This is the reason for the increasing 
number of microcontroller systems which include specific hardware to monitor their own power 
consumption. Furthermore, some microcontrollers, such as STM32L0 (STMicroelectronics, Geneva, 
Italy), are able to measure their instantaneous power consumption without additional hardware. These 
power measurements may be used to handle the node energy efficiently, and may even be sent with the 
data to provide global energy management. 
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In this environment, a complete monitoring tool must be able to handle the relevant information 
about the energy behavior of the sensor node. 
Due to energy restrictions in this kind of systems it is very important to reduce the energy consumed 
by the monitoring operation. Consequently, the best solution consists in the addition of an external 
self-powered node performing passive monitoring, which introduces no energy intrusion. Nevertheless, 
the solution proposed in this paper seems to be very close to these solutions, using an external monitor 
node but increasing observability by using active monitoring solutions (software traps). It must be 
noted that the monitor node include its own power source (battery, energy harvesting techniques or 
even a wired power installation) to avoid changing the behavior of the monitored sensor node. 
The monitoring tool should be aware of the intrusion in power consumption that it introduces. 
Consequently, this section studies the energy intrusion caused in the sensor node when the monitoring 
system is capturing. This intrusion is caused, on the one hand, by the communication hardware 
interface used to support the Mon-Inf interface and, on the other hand, by the time taken to execute the 
trap. The latter has already been addressed in Section 5.1. 
To evaluate the power consumption of the communication hardware interface with and without 
monitoring operation, the instantaneous power consumption in both cases has been measured by means 
of a set of experiments. They were performed in accordance with the plan described in Section 5. 
Power consumption was determined by modifying the application program used in the sensor node in 
the time intrusion evaluation to make it into an infinite loop, avoiding sleep mode and keeping the 
peripherals used enabled. With this program in execution, about 7000 samples of sensor node electrical 
power were taken—18 samples per second—and averaged. Measurements were taken with an Agilent 
34405A Multimeter (Agilent Technologies, Inc., Santa Clara, CA, USA). This multimeter has a  
5.5 digit resolution, with an accuracy of ±(0.05% of reading +0.015% of range) for our measuring 
conditions [26]. Both non-monitored and monitored operation measures were repeated until the 
confidence interval was over 90% according to Equation 1. 
These experiments were run for all the interfaces considered (parallel, SPI, and USART) and for 
several communication speeds and data sizes. The results obtained show that electrical current with no 
monitoring operation was 22.53 mA. They also demonstrate that the evaluated communication speeds 
and data sizes do not affect the instantaneous power consumption. Table 6 shows the ratio between the 
electrical current required in monitored operation compared with non-monitoring operation when each 
interface is used. 
Table 6. Current increment due to monitoring operation by interface. 
Interface 
Measured Current 
(mA) 
Increase on  
Non-Monitored Operation 
Parallel 22.74 0.92% 
SPI 23.08 2.38% 
USART 22.86 1.44% 
The monitoring operation introduces, as previously stated, two causes of energy intrusion: the 
electrical current increased by the communication hardware and the overtime introduced by the 
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execution of software trap’s code. As a consequence, energy intrusion may be calculated as shown  
in Equation (3): 
∆ܧ = ܧ௠ − ܧ௥ = ܸ × ܫ௠ × ௠ܶ − ܸ × ܫ௥ × ௥ܶ (3)
where Em, Im and Tm are the energy, current and execution time when monitoring, and Er, Ir, and Tr are 
the same variables when no monitoring is being performed. V is the power voltage in all cases. From 
this expression it is easy to deduce Equation (4): 
∆ܧ = ܧ௠ − ܧ௥ = ܸ × ܫ௠ × ௠ܶ − 	ܸ × ܫ௥ × ௥ܶ = ܸ × ሾܫ௠ × ௠ܶ − ܫ௥ × ௥ܶሿ
= ܸ	 ×	 ሾ(ܫ௥ + ∆ܫ) × ௠ܶ − ܫ௥ × ௥ܶሿ = ܸ × ሾܫ௥ × ௠ܶ + ∆ܫ × ௠ܶ −	ܫ௥ × ௥ܶሿ
= 	ܸ	 ×	 ሾܫ௥ × ( ௠ܶ − ௥ܶ) + ∆ܫ × ௠ܶሿ = 	ܸ	 ×	 ሾܫ௥ × ∆ܶ + ∆ܫ × ௠ܶሿ
= 	ܸ	 × ܫ௥ ×	∆ܶ + ܸ	 × ∆ܫ × ௠ܶ = ௥ܹ × ∆ܶ + ∆ܹ × ௠ܶ 
(4)
It can be seen that, as previously mentioned, the energy increment is caused by two factors. The 
first is the execution time increment due to monitoring tasks, and the other is the power consumption 
increment caused by the hardware used for monitoring. With regard to the first of these factors, the 
proposed hybrid solution only requires trap capture and basic communication tasks. With regard to the 
second, the proposed solution only requires the use of the communications hardware interface. 
Finally, the percentage of energy intrusion may be calculated using Equation (5): 
∆ܧ
ܧ௥ =
ܫ௥ × ∆ܶ + ∆ܫ × ௠ܶ
ܫ௥ × ௥ܶ  (5)
As all these data are known, it is possible to use the values for current increments (Table 6) and 
time intrusion (Table 3) to obtain the energy intrusion for each interface. Table 7 shows the values 
obtained. The energy intrusion can be considered low in relation to the normal operation of the sensor 
node (below 3%). From Table 7 it can be seen that the power consumption intrusion increases with 
data size and is higher for the parallel interface (as expected) due to the number of lines involved in  
trap transmission. 
Table 7. Energy Intrusion (%) per event. 
Data Size 
Parallel  
(16 Bits) 
SPI  
18 mbps 
SPI  
4.5 mbps 
SPI  
2.25 mbps 
USART 
115.2 kbps 
16 bits 1.00% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 1.57% 
32 bits 1.06% 2.55% 2.55% 2.55% 1.70% 
64 bits 1.22% 2.67% 2.67% 2.67% 1.97% 
128 bits 1.49% 2.94% 2.94% 2.94% 2.52% 
It can be observed that when using the SPI interface transmission speed has very little influence on 
energy intrusion. The small amount of data transferred by trap makes speed almost irrelevant (Table 3), 
and no consumption difference has been found (Table 6). 
It must be noted that these values correspond to the worst trap generation scenario, where a very 
small application code is executed (only the capture of a sensor). A lower trap generation rate would 
significantly reduce this energy intrusion. 
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6. Discussion 
From the previous numerical evaluation it can be concluded that, as observed, the use of a parallel 
interface presents a small advantage from the point of view of code intrusion. The parallel interface 
presents a greater advantage in energy intrusion, despite producing greater time intrusion, because it 
produces a low electrical current increment. However, a drawback of the parallel interface is that it 
requires approximately 20 lines (depending on the implementation), which are not always available in 
sensor nodes. If the lines are available, physical attachment should be straightforward using a  
parallel connector. 
Serial USART-based interfaces also introduce a small amount of code, as it is a very common and 
easy-to-use interface. Its energy intrusion is close to the parallel case, despite its low transmission 
speed. Its greatest drawback can be found in time intrusion, which is many times greater than that 
presented by the other interfaces studied (Table 3). The shorter word length and lower transmission 
speed makes communication with the monitor node very slow (Table 4). This implies that the number 
of events per second (trap frequency) could be limited by the capabilities of this interface. 
Finally, SPI-based interfaces present a balanced behavior between the other two options. Although 
its code intrusion is greater than the other interfaces, it is only 150 bytes approximately. Additionally, 
this interface permits high trap generation frequency. Finally, physical attachment and detachment of 
monitor node should be straightforward, as the required lines (only four) are externally available, using 
a serial connector. 
The intrusion when the proposed monitor uses the studied interfaces can be considered low in all of 
the three aspects mentioned (time, energy and code intrusion). The difference between the interfaces is 
not definitive; in some cases the choice of one of them may be conditioned by other circumstances,  
such as the available interfaces in the sensor nodes or application/designer restrictions. Even when no  
other interface is available, the serial USART-based interface may be an appropriate solution, 
accepting its drawbacks. 
To summarize the previous studies, a ranking based on a preference index is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Preference index of each sensor-monitor interface. 
 
Parallel  
(16 Bits) 
SPI  
18 mbps 
SPI  
4.5 mbps 
SPI  
2.25 mbps 
USART 
115.2 kbps 
Time Intrusion 4 1 2 3 5 
Code Intrusion 1 3 4 5 2 
Energy Intrusion 1 3 4 5 2 
6.1. A Real Application 
Previous analyses were performed in a high stress environment, with a high trap generation rate, in 
order to study the worst case scenario. This section describes the measurement of the influence of these 
intrusion effects when applied to the monitoring of a real WSN application. 
The monitored application consists in a temperature measuring system. It is formed by a set of 
nodes with a temperature transducer which periodically (every 2000 ms) wake up, capture the 
temperature from the transducer, send it to the gateway (without routing capabilities), and finally 
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return to sleep mode. The working time of this application is approximately 200 ms. The code size is 
approximately 12 KB, and its required energy before monitoring was measured at  
24.58 mA on average when in active mode (working time). Both parallel and SPI interfaces were 
available for monitoring purposes. 
In order to monitor this application, four traps were defined, registering four events: Node Wake Up 
from Sleep (0x04), Read sensor 0 (0x01), Node Sends Data (0x06), and Node Goes to Sleep Mode 
(0x09), as defined in Table 2. All these traps send 128 bits of additional data. 
In the real application the execution time was measured for SPI and parallel interfaces. The time 
increment was found to be 130 ms and 120 ms when parallel and SPI interfaces were used 
respectively. Thus, the time intrusion caused was 0.065% in parallel and 0.06% in SPI. 
The evaluation of the code intrusion in the proposed real application is very simple. Parallel 
implementation requires the addition of 300 bytes (see Equation (2)) that represents a code intrusion of 
2.44%. On the other hand, SPI required 500 bytes of code, producing an intrusion of 4.07%. 
Finally, electrical power consumption was measured in the sensor node when monitoring was active 
with both interfaces. Instantaneous power consumption when using the SPI interface was found to be 
25.2 mA, and the parallel interface produced a measurement of 24.85 mA. 
This increase of instantaneous power consumption, together with the additional time intrusion, 
produces an energy intrusion of approximately 2.6% in the case of the SPI and 1.2% in the case of the 
parallel interface. These results correspond to a four-event monitoring, so they are lower than those 
presented in Table 7 (four to five times lower). As has been said in the previous section, the results 
shown in Table 7 correspond to a worst-case scenario for trap generation rate. 
6.2. Comparison with Bibliography Cases 
The results are quite similar for both interfaces. In order to highlight the difference between them, 
Figure 8 shows how this intrusion would affect the working time values used in other real 
implementations found in the literature. For example, in [27] (a wireless sensor node to monitor track 
bicycle performance) the sensor node active time is 30 ms. In others cases, such as [28] (an application 
for heating and cooling loads) and [29] (a wireless node enabled by wireless power with some sensors) 
the node active time reaches 100 ms or more. In all cases, the percentage of intrusion is very low—less 
than 1.5% in the worst case—even in the smallest case (10 ms). 
 
Figure 8. Percentages of time intrusion (128 bits/4 event logs). 
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The time intrusion of active monitoring tools is much greater that those caused by the presented 
solution. For example, an active tool like Envirolog [3,30], in which the sensor node is in charge of 
capturing the trap events, processing and storing them in flash memory, can generate an overhead of 
70% for 15 traps. This overhead seems unacceptable in a real scenario, explaining the interest in 
hybrid solutions to free the sensor node from most of the monitoring functions. 
The overhead of instruction code (inside the sensor node) of active monitoring tools is higher than 
that associated with the hybrid monitor presented. For example, additional features of Sympathy 
occupy 1558 bytes of ROM (Read-Only Memory); EnviroLog requires 15,160 bytes of node flash 
memory [3]; and the Lightweight Tracing program’s requirement can reach approximately 4000 bytes [19]. 
No energy intrusion data was found in the bibliography studied. As the proposed systems consider 
the monitoring as a temporal phase inside the life time of a WSN, the energy consumption has not been 
analyzed in depth. However, active monitoring techniques require the monitored node to perform 
many operations to record its monitoring information. From Equation 3, it seems obvious that these 
techniques increase the power consumption as they increase the working time and, in most cases, they 
also require the use of hardware resources from the sensor node. Both increased working time and use 
of hardware resources result in an energy consumption many times greater than that observed when 
using the hybrid solution approach presented in this paper. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper an active hybrid (software and hardware) monitor has been presented. It is able to 
collect detailed information about the operation of a sensor node with very low intrusion, and thus 
without affecting the node’s performance. 
The software traps implementation is easily portable to many hardware platforms, as it has been 
released with open-access license. The libraries are intended to be freely distributed in order to be used 
without any royalties. Software traps become non-operational when no monitor node is attached, with 
a negligible impact on sensor node’s performance. 
The design of the monitor node makes it easily attachable and detachable from sensor nodes. 
Monitor nodes may then be removed when the monitoring campaigns ends. 
A monitoring campaign may be repeated at any moment, just plugging again the monitor nodes, if 
software traps are implemented. For instance, the monitor nodes may be used for debugging purposes 
at implementation stage, then removed—just disconnected—when sensor nodes are finished. Later, 
after the deployment of the WSN, if undesirable behavior of sensor nodes is detected, monitor nodes 
may be reconnected again to evaluate the in situ operation. When the problem is detected and 
corrected, monitor nodes may be removed again. 
At the same time, monitor nodes use standard interfaces in order to be attachable to many different 
sensor node architectures. The monitoring tools found in bibliography are always hardware-dependent, 
being built for a specific sensor node. 
The monitor nodes also include its own power source, battery based or even wired power 
installation, to avoid changing the behavior of the monitored sensor node. 
As a first step, and following a study of monitoring tool requirements, a new architecture was 
presented for monitoring systems. This architecture addresses all the characteristics and functions 
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required in monitoring tools, structured in a hierarchical way. It also provides advantages such as 
flexibility, reusability, and standardization. 
Using this architecture, an active hybrid monitor was implemented. It is based on the use of new 
additional hardware, called a monitor node, which must be attached to the sensor node that is to be 
monitored. This monitor node is in charge of many monitoring functions—data format, data storage, 
time stamp, etc.—reducing the interference to the sensor node application. 
The monitor node is complemented with software which is introduced into the sensor node. This 
piece of software captures the relevant events to be monitored and uses a standard interface to transmit 
them to the monitor node if present. The designer may define their own relevant events to monitor, and 
introduce them into the application code by means of software traps. This mechanism offers both 
flexibility and the possibility of obtaining detailed data regarding the internal behavior of the sensor 
node. If no monitor node is attached, traps are disabled, causing a negligible intrusion. 
The use of a standard interface means that the monitor nodes can be easily added to the WSN 
during its development, improving system debugging and development time, or during the deployment 
stage to verify the correct operation of the sensor network. After removal, the monitor nodes can be 
reused in the monitoring of another WSN, and its cost may be recouped during repeated use in 
different monitoring studies. 
In order to increase reusability, many interfaces may be used to communicate between the sensor 
node and monitor node. The performance of these interfaces may influence the overall intrusion caused 
to sensor node operation and, thus, affect the representativeness of the obtained results. In this paper 
several interfaces have been evaluated and characterized, with parallel or SPI interfaces being shown 
to be those which offer the best performance. However, as eighteen pins are necessary for parallel 
communication, which are not always available for monitoring purposes in sensor network nodes, it 
can be concluded that SPI, when available, is the better option in most cases. 
The monitor was also applied to the monitoring of a real WSN application. Real measurements 
were obtained from a true operation in laboratory conditions. These measurements had associated 
timestamps and were stored in a SD non-volatile memory for later analysis. 
As a result, it has been shown that low time interference permits a high trap generation rate. On the 
other hand, low code intrusion may be assumed in most common modern microcontrollers, even those 
with very low memory resources. Finally, the hybrid philosophy used allows the power consumption 
required to fulfill the monitoring tasks to be divided between the monitor node and sensor node, thus 
reducing the energy intrusion in the latter. This makes these techniques highly suitable for WSN 
monitoring (for designing, implementing, deploying or debugging purposes), but they may also be 
applied to the monitoring of many embedded systems. 
Future research in monitor node development could include the use of communication interfaces, 
following the architecture in Figure 1, to provide greater support to the Interchange Layer. Many 
monitor nodes, and even passive monitors such as wireless network sniffers, could combine their data 
in a database. To achieve this goal it would be necessary to standardize the data format. Diverse 
monitoring data sources, even from different manufacturers, could then be joined to observe the 
behavior of the entire network. Real-time analysis and visualization of obtained data could also be 
improved, focusing on the use of standard tools. 
Sensors 2015, 15 23950 
 
 
A classification of the WSNs according to their acceptable monitor intrusion should be defined, and 
this intrusion index must condition the overall intrusion—number of captured events, communication 
interface used, etc.—which can be observed in a single monitoring campaign. 
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